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Abstract 
 
This article concerns the manner in which the European Union (EU) Information and 
Consultation of Employees (ICE) Directive has been implemented in the UK in the 
harsh corporate conditions of restructuring, redundancy and site closure. Drawing on 
interview and documentary evidence from six case companies (Peugeot-Citroen, 
General Motors, Prudential, Aviva, Marconi, Rolls Royce), the article exposes major 
fault lines in the effectiveness of the UK‟s ICE Regulations to provide even limited 
protection for employees who were presented with redundancy as a fait accompli. 
Contrary to management claims, ICE arrangements have not provided additional levels 
of representation whether to complement unions or to fill the „representation gap‟ left 
by declining coverage. The failure to consult raises broader questions on the wider 
political and legislative environment in the UK. 
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Introduction  
 
This article concerns the manner in which the European Union (EU) Information and 
Consultation of Employees (ICE) Directive has been implemented in the UK. The 
evidence presented here raises significant questions over the intentions of UK firms 
regarding the ICE Regulations, particularly when dealing with large-scale 
redundancies. The origins of the article arise from an apparent contradiction in recent 
UK employment relations. On the one hand, there have been several recent 
announcements by prominent firms of redundancies and facility closures, most notably 
Peugeot‟s abrupt decision in April 2006 to close their last UK manufacturing plant. The 
frequent refrain of workers and unions is that employers failed to give advance 
warning, or neglected to discuss possible alternatives to redundancy plans. Yet, on the 
other hand, in April 2005 the ICE Regulations achieved statutory force, signifying an 
important development in UK employment law
1
 which was expected to have 
considerable significance for industrial relations (Hall, 2006). The response of the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) exemplified the conviction that positive outcomes 
would follow for employee representation and union organising, leading potentially „to 
the biggest change in workplace relations for a generation‟ (cited in Hall, 2005:103). 
Such optimism was rooted in the fact that the Regulations established for the first time 
in the UK a statutory framework giving employees the right to be informed and 
consulted by their employers on a range of business, employment and restructuring 
issues. In short, it is reasonable to assume that the Regulations would have prevented 
companies such as Peugeot from taking peremptory decisions over plant closure.  
 
It is first necessary to provide a little background to the ICE Regulations. The existing 
literature, notably by Hall (2005; 2006) and Hall and Terry (2004), provides an 
excellent platform for understanding the purpose, nature and detail of the Regulations 
and has delivered valuable insights into the anticipated and initial responses of 
employers and unions. Nevertheless, such early attempts to offer an „interim 
assessment‟ of ICE‟s impact, the tenor have been understandably speculative and the 
conclusions necessarily provisional (Hall, 2006). Two years after enforcement, we are 
now better placed to marshal empirical evidence on outcomes.  The intention is not to 
offer a comprehensive evaluation of the ICE Regulations in respect of the extent of 
coverage, the detail of arrangements and so on, but rather to alter the prism through 
which the efficacy of ICE may be evaluated. Arguably a principal measure of the 
Regulations‟ value should be in their effectiveness in conditions of restructuring, 
proposed redundancy and site closure. It should be recalled that it was Renault‟s 
precipitate closure of the Vilvoorde plant in Belgium in 1997, exposing loopholes in 
national legislation and the European regulatory framework on collective redundancy 
and worker rights, which stimulated the European Commission (EC) to formulate the 
ICE Directive http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1997/03/feature/be9703202f.html). 
Thus the UK Regulations originated in the EU‟s attempt to prevent „shock‟ 
redundancies and to ensure that employees and their representatives would be informed 
and consulted on major decisions affecting the security and conditions of their 
                                                 
1
 Non-EU readers should note that the European Union itself does not make law; the European 
Commission passes Directives which then have to be turned into national legislation (transposition) in 
the individual member states. 
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employment, and that they might influence outcomes by presenting alternatives to 
company proposals. 
 
Conceptually, this paper presents an interesting opportunity to contrast the assumptions 
and consequences of the neo-liberal labour market model currently held by the UK with 
the „Social Market‟ model of continental Europe. The long history of statutory 
employee rights in most European states was integrated and made a key plank in the 
formation of the Single European Market in 1992. The Maastricht Treaty setting up the 
Single Market had included a Social Chapter covering areas such as employment 
security, health and safety, working time and rights to information and consultation. EU 
policy thinking was that, firstly a single market in labour should be based on a 
harmonisation of employment conditions and secondly, that competition within Europe 
should be tempered by a concern with the employment and social conditions of 
Europe‟s citizens.  What this has meant in practice is not that there have been no 
collective redundancies, but that it is more usual for employee representatives (through 
the unions or works councils) to be jointly involved in discussions („social dialogue‟ in 
EU terminology) over how the redundancies or closures are to be handled, the terms of 
compensation and support for finding alternative employment.   
 
British Governments, with no prior history of positive employment rights, distanced 
themselves wherever possible from such thinking (refusing, under the Conservatives, to 
even sign the Social Chapter).  For the past decade British Labour Governments, firmly 
embracing a neo-liberal agenda, have themselves implicitly contrasted the benefits (to 
employers) of Britain‟s „flexible labour market‟ with the perceived rigidities of more 
highly regulated EU member states such as France and Germany. Essentially, and as 
seen by the unions, this comes down to the fact that it has been much easier and 
cheaper to make collective redundancies in Britain than in other EU countries. Thus the 
ICE Regulations were seen by the TUC and its affiliates as offering some hope that, as 
with health and safety and working time, some aspects of Social Europe would be 
imported to the UK, to their members‟ benefit. 
 
In this article, using a case study methodology, we examine the role which the ICE 
Regulations played during the process of redundancy in four UK employment sectors 
and show that their efficacy in ameliorating redundancy has, so far, been extremely 
limited. We argue that this limitation reflects a lack of desire on the part of British 
management to use the ICE processes as a genuine vehicle for consultation. The 
research on which this paper is based was prompted by trade union (specifically 
Amicus) concerns regarding the apparent inability of the UK‟s Regulations to protect 
members from corporate restructuring and the unilateral exercise of managerial 
prerogative. Evidence is evaluated from six case study companies of both historical and 
contemporary significance to the UK economy: motor vehicle manufacturing (Peugeot-
Citroen, General Motors), financial services (Prudential, Aviva), electronics (Marconi) 
and aerospace/engineering (Rolls Royce). Case selection was stimulated largely by the 
incidence of significant job loss since the Regulations‟ enactment. Principal lines of 
inquiry included; the extent to which companies pre-empted the Regulations and 
established I & C fora prior to April 2005; the nature of arrangements (if any) 
subsequently introduced; and the implications for the processes and substance of 
collective bargaining following enactment, particularly where new ICE arrangements 
were established. Finally, there were questions regarding the impact of the Regulations 
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on employers‟ actions and, crucially, of the extent to which employees and unions were 
informed of, and involved in consultation over, corporate restructuring proposals.  
 
The article is structured, first, to provide synopses of the EU Directive and, following 
transposition, of the UK‟s Regulations, indicating potential weaknesses for workers and 
unions. A brief explication of research methods and data sources is followed by an 
evaluation of the empirical evidence. The two motor manufacturing cases are 
considered together as are those in financial services, while those in electronics and 
aerospace/engineering are assessed separately.  The evidence is unequivocal that 
employers failed to inform and consult, contradicting the rhetoric surrounding the ICE 
Regulations and the intention of the I & C Directive. The fact that decisions to effect 
redundancies were effectively fait accompli challenges optimistic expectations that the 
Regulations would expand union and employee influence over corporate decision-
making. We conclude with general observations relating the information and 
consultation provisions to Labour‟s employment legislation framework as dominated 
by the influence of neo-liberalism (Smith and Morton, 2006).  
 
The EU Information and Consultation of Employees’ Directive  
 
The UK‟s ICE Regulations derived from the EC Directive on Information and 
Consultation in the Workplace, which required Member States to establish „a general 
framework setting out minimum requirements for the right to information and 
consultation‟ (Article 1), ensuring that employers consult employees over potential 
changes in their employment. Article 4 laid out employers‟ obligations on information 
provision which included: recent and probable development of an undertaking‟s (or 
establishment‟s) economic situation; the situation, structure and probable development 
of employment or anticipatory measures, particularly where there are threats to 
employment; decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work organisation or 
contractual relations; information to be provided timeously to enable employees‟ 
representatives to prepare for consultation (Hayes, 2004). Consultation requirements 
included enabling employee representatives to meet with the employer, who must 
provide responses to opinions they might formulate, with a view to reaching agreement 
on decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work organisation or contractual 
relations.  Significantly, Article 5 emphasised that practical arrangements were to be 
defined and implemented by Member States in accordance with their national law and 
industrial relations practice. Similarly, Member States would determine the „adequate‟ 
administrative or judicial procedures, appropriate measures in the event of non-
compliance and „effective, proportionate and dissuasive‟ penalties in circumstances of 
the infringement of the Directive (Article 7). 
 
Several critical observations can be made of these objectives. Firstly, despite the 
apparently unambiguous prescription of employees‟ rights, there is, as in other EU 
Directives (for example the Directive on Working Time), little structural detail about 
what amounts to a set of general objectives. Secondly, the I & C Directive essentially 
does not embrace co-determination (Smith and Morton, 2006: 409) and marks a further 
shift along the participation spectrum from those conceptions of industrial democracy 
based on worker rights to softer employer-led forms of employee involvement (Blyton 
and Turnbull, 2004; Hall and Marginson, 2005; Hyman and Mason, 1995). Thirdly, 
given the latitude accorded Member States in determining arrangements, the 
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transposition process can prove additionally decisive in determining any Directive‟s 
impact.  
 
UK Government, the ICE Directive and Regulations  
 
From the outset the UK Labour government threatened to stymie the I & C Directive‟s 
promise „to fill the gaps and counter the shortcomings…in the employee information 
and consultation provisions‟ (Memorandum accompanying Draft Directive, 1998). 
Labour opposed the attempt to overcome this statutory deficit
2
, consistently blocking 
the I & C Directive‟s introduction (Labour Research, 2000), arguing that it would „cut 
across existing practices in member states to no benefit‟ and was „difficult to reconcile 
with subsidiarity‟ (Hall, 2005: 108). It was only after the dissolution of the „blocking 
minority‟ (Denmark, Germany, Ireland, UK) that the UK government abandoned its 
opposition in principle, leading ultimately to the Directive‟s adoption in 2002 (Hall et 
al, 2002). Subsequently, the government was prominent in successful attempts to dilute 
the original draft Directive by removing the obligation on employers to inform and 
consult, and widening the scope given to social partners to negotiate arrangements. It 
also omitted the Commission‟s proposed approach to sanctions for non-compliance, 
under which the „legal effect of restructuring decisions taken by employers in serious 
breach of their information and consulting obligations would be suspended‟ (Hall, 
2005: 108).  
 
Transposition produced further dilution. Significantly, the government prefaced 
discussions on the proposed Regulations with a distinct set of political-economic values 
and assumptions. Specifically, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) advocated a 
version of ICE predicated, not on extending employee rights, but on advocacy of the 
„High Performance Workplace‟ (DTI, 2002), linking economic success to employee 
involvement. This amounted to a straightforward HRM position in which enhanced 
consultation creates a climate of trust which induces greater commitment to an 
organisation‟s goals and thus improves performance. However, for the employers‟ body 
the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), even a modest commitment to employee 
involvement went too far (CBI, 2002). In rejecting the claim that ICE was necessary for 
improved performance, it restated its opposition to any kind of European stakeholder 
model and to the UK government‟s commitment to partnership. Its preference was for 
direct consultation which excluded employee representatives or trade unions. These 
were preconditions for maintaining the „strength‟ of the UK‟s flexible labour markets. 
Reflecting the pressure to adopt minimalist principles, a further document (DTI, 2003) 
established parameters for concluding consultation with the CBI and TUC. The 
outcome was an agreed framework, which differed little from the final version of the 
ICE Regulations
3
.  
 
Although constraints of space prohibit detailed analysis, it is necessary to emphasise 
some implications arising from the main provisions. Most importantly, the government 
delivered maximum flexibility for employers who are not obliged to conform to the 
                                                 
2
 The UK, Ireland and Italy were the only EU states lacking laws or legally-binding national agreements 
placing a duty on employers to inform and consult with employee representatives on economic and 
employment issues.  
3
 Initially applying to undertakings of 150 employees but extending to undertakings with at least 100 
employees (6 April 2007) and 50 employees (6 April 2008). 
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sprit of the original I & C Directive. Rather the Regulations‟ „trigger mechanisms‟ 
permit employers not to act unless 10% of employees request negotiations on an I & C 
agreement. In similar vein, and responding to the CBI‟s appeal for managerial 
discretion, the government encouraged parties „to develop their own arrangements 
tailored to their particular circumstances though voluntary agreements‟ (ACAS, 2004).  
The expectation was that employers would prefer the voluntary Previously Existing 
Agreements (PEA) route, which provided numerous advantages over negotiated 
agreements and standard provisions, not least the fact that PEAs are not legally binding, 
have no remedy at the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) and can be concluded at 
any point before the date of a valid employee request to initiate negotiations. PEAs 
assist employers in „effectively pre-empting the use of the Regulations statutory 
procedures (significantly higher thresholds of employee support being required to 
trigger new negotiations where undertakings have PEAs in place)‟ (Hall, 2006: 459-
460). Even when the statutory negotiating procedure is invoked, the I & C Regulations 
stress the importance of enterprise-specific agreements.  
 
The Regulations are non-prescriptive concerning the terms of either PEAs or negotiated 
agreements. Diverse outcomes are possible, including the company council, Joint 
Consultative Committee model, or union-based arrangements. While no explicit 
reference was made to direct forms of information and consultation, they were 
implicitly conceded since, „The parties to a negotiated agreement will be able to agree 
the information and consultation arrangements that best suit their needs and 
agreements‟ (Hall, 2005: 110). Nor do the Regulations accord specific statutory rights 
to unions, which have been „written out of the script‟ of the standard I & C provisions 
under which representatives must be directly elected by workplace ballot. Of course, 
unions do have potential roles: negotiating and approving PEAs, acting as negotiating 
reps (albeit at the employer‟s discretion) and standing as candidates for I & C bodies. 
Further, the Regulations offer unions the chance of gaining footholds as elected I & C 
representatives in non-recognised areas (Labour Research, 2004). Consequently, unions 
generally welcomed the Regulations as contributing to the democratisation of the 
workplace or at least to creating more socially responsible employer-employee agendas. 
Yet fears existed that ICE would deliver only post facto information about company 
intent or would undermine collective agreements „by setting up separate workplace 
councils for information and consultation‟ (Unison, date?). For many, „the jury is still 
out‟ and it is only through case law and concrete experience that the cautious 
expectations will be tested.  
 
Academic commentary overall is less sanguine. Davis and Kirkpatrick believe that the 
Regulations have „disconnected union-based structures from the representative 
structures of information and consultation‟ (2004: 141), giving statutory support to a 
second channel of communication from which unions are excluded, even where they 
are recognised or possess members. For Smith and Morton (2006: 409) this is 
unprecedented and contrasts markedly with existing issue-specific statutory 
consultation, by allowing employers to determine the boundaries of I & C procedures to 
fill the „representation gap‟. Further, as Moore et al (2004: 82) argue, employer-
dominated consultative bodies may weaken or displace union organisation. As a prime 
example of „reflexive‟ employment law (Hall, 2006), where legislation promotes 
voluntary adjustments to the employment relationship, employer interests would always 
dominate. Indeed, so employer-friendly were the Regulations that the CBI could 
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celebrate the fact that the government had „made sense of a poor piece of EU 
legislation‟ (Hall, 2005: 103).  
 
 
 
Methods, Sources, Case Profiles 
 
Thirteen semi-structured interviews, designed to achieve consistency in data acquisition 
and analysis, were conducted with full-time trade union officers, senior representatives 
and shop stewards between September 2006 and January 2007. Interviews lasted 
between 45 minutes and two hours and were recorded and transcribed. This evidence 
was complemented by company documentation, including feasibility studies, 
restructuring proposals, annual reports and ICE arrangements. Diverse union data - 
media briefings, members‟ communications, alternative business plans, and 
correspondence - were collated and evaluated.  
 
In addition, organisational contextual analysis is rooted in longitudinal case study 
research completed at five of the six firms.  At Rolls-Royce Bristol the researchers have 
tracked changes in work organization, industrial relations practices and staff 
consultation processes over a nine year period. Over this time the work has involved 
multiple site visits, questionnaire surveys of shop stewards and workers, interviews 
with sixteen senior managers and line managers, eight convenors, twenty shop 
stewards, fifty manual and non-manual workers and two full time regional officers.  
(AUTHORS; xxx AUTHORS xxx).  At GM-Vauxhall, a similar longitudinal approach 
over a period of fourteen years was supplemented with recent interviews of convenor 
and deputy convenor, four stewards and two fulltime officers, (Amicus and TGWU) on 
the impact of ICE during the jobs crisis of May-June 2006.  (See AUTHORS xxx; 
AUTHORS xxx) For more than a decade one of the team has conducted research in the 
financial services sector, notably in relation to organisational restructuring and the re-
configuration of interactive service work in the form of call centres and the outcomes 
for employment relations and participation.  (AUTHORS xxx; AUTHORS xxx).  
Latterly, studies have encompassed the phenomenon of offshoring and the manifold 
consequences for employment levels and union representation (need some citations 
here). 
 
Prior to examining the empirical evidence we present summary profiles of the case 
companies (Table 1).  
 
 
Table 1: Profiles of Case Companies  
 
 
Company 
Bargaining 
Arrangements/ 
Recognition 
Union  
Density 
Union(s) ICE 
Initiatives 
Name of ICE 
Body 
Restructuring/ 
redundancy 
Peugeot-
Citroen 
Full CB 95% Amicus/ 
T&G 
No* n/a Closure of Ryton, 
2,300 redundancies 
GM-
Vauxhall 
Full CB 95% Amicus/ 
T&G 
No n/a Termination of shift, 
1,000 redundancies 
Prudential Mixe - full CB/ 
no CB 
56% unionised 
sites 
Amicus PEA Employee Forum Closure of Belfast 
and Bristol sites 
Aviva Limited 
recognition/CB 
30% Amicus Employee  
Forum 
Your Forum Organisation-wide 
restructuring 
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Marconi Full CB 30% Amicus/ 
T&G/GMB 
PEA Forum Crisis, takeover, 800 
redundancies 
Rolls 
Royce 
Full CB 100% (manual), 
70% (non-manual) 
Amicus/ 
T&G 
PEA UK Information 
and Consultation 
Council 
No specific initiative, 
ongoing restructuring 
* Global Framework Agreement contained consultative mechanisms 
 
5. Motor Vehicle Industry – Peugeot-Citroen and GM-Vauxhall 
 
The UK car industry has been transformed within two decades under the impact of 
intensified competition, changes in corporate structure and ownership and extensive 
geographical re-location. Foreign-owned firms now dominate the UK, with almost one-
half of the 1.6m cars produced in 2005, manufactured by Japan‟s „big three‟ of Honda, 
Nissan and Toyota (Financial Times, 19/4/06). By 2006 Peugeot-Citroen had one 
remaining manufacturing plant, at Ryton, which employed 2,300. Production since 
1999 had focused exclusively on the 206 model, and an indication of declining demand 
had been the decision to end the third „C‟ shift in March 2005. By 2006 GM-Vauxhall‟s 
production, centred on the Astra (and small van variant), was confined to Ellesmere 
Port and a workforce of 3,000; the closure of GM‟s Luton plant in 2002 had sharply 
raised questions over Ellesmere Port‟s future.   
 
At Ryton and Ellesmere Port years of downsizing, closure threats, „whipsawing‟, lean 
production and European and global corporate and product strategies (Stewart et al, 
2007) had profoundly shaped the character of employment relations. While the 
workforces at both plants had remained solidly unionised (T&G majority, Amicus 
minority) and collective bargaining arrangements continued at national and plant levels, 
workplace organisation inevitably had been weakened. Essentially a new politics of 
production prevailed in which, despite resistance and contestation particularly over pay, 
the unions had been compelled to accommodate to company demands over lean 
production, flexible working and productivity improvements. Stewart et al (2007) 
demonstrate how at GM, through five successive company-union agreements the 
promise of job security as the quid pro quo for flexibility and intensification proved 
illusory.  
 
Neither Peugeot nor GM took specific initiatives in anticipation of the ICE Regulations. 
In Peugeot‟s case this neglect was not because the company was unaware of the 
potential implications following enforcement. Indeed, Amicus minutes of a special JNC 
meeting (24/03/05) to discuss termination of the „C‟ shift record Peugeot‟s HR Director 
stating that „the information and consultation legislation had nothing to do with the 
timing of this decision‟. In the view of the Amicus national officer, this amounted to a 
knowing avoidance of soon-to-be enacted Regulations. „They did not consult over the 
change [and] came to us with a decision…‟ leaving the unions to negotiate only the 
voluntary redundancy package (Interview, 22/09/06). In GM‟s case, ICE was never „on 
the radar‟.   
 
There were additional dimensions to consultation. Peugeot‟s Global Framework 
Agreement on Social Responsibility‟ (Peugeot-Citroën, 2006a) promoted ten principles, 
including commitments on consultation and participation, particularly in respect of 
providing employees with regular and timely information on company operations and 
on issues affecting working conditions and employment. Employee participation 
initiatives were positively encouraged. This „global‟ commitment to social dialogue 
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contrasts markedly with the absence of formal ICE arrangements in the UK. Insofar as 
consultation existed it was confined to quality and quantity of production issues 
through monthly plant-level DCC meetings. Union officers in both companies 
contrasted the willingness to consult over productivity gains with restrictions on 
institutional access to strategic decision-making.    
 
Both companies gave promises regarding their plants‟ immediate futures. In March 
2005 Peugeot‟s Chief Executive J-M Folz offered a personal commitment to the unions 
that Ryton would, as a minimum, continue to produce the 206 on two shifts until 2010 
(Amicus-TGWU, 2006) and Peugeot would consult over future plans. As late as 
January 2006 the Director of Corporate Communications had insisted that Peugeot „has 
a big industrial base in western Europe and there is no suggestion that we would shift 
that production‟ (JustAuto.com, 18/01/06). Ryton was „amongst the best of our plants‟ 
having made „tremendous improvements in productivity‟ and quality with „right first 
time [having] risen from 55% to 78%. Similarly, GM hailed Ellesmere Port‟s success; 
the Astra achieved number two in UK sales (2006), following huge improvements in 
quality and Ellesmere Port was top of GM‟s quality performance league (Weekly Team 
Brief, GM Manufacturing EP, 03/07/06). Despite these assurances, peremptory 
decisions of closure (Ryton) and large-scale redundancies (Ellesmere Port) followed 
shortly thereafter.  
 
On 18
 
April 2006, Peugeot announced that production would end by mid-2007. 
Underpinning the decision was the building of additional capacity, equivalent to Ryton, 
with an investment of €350m at its new factory in Trnava, Slovakia. Production of the 
new 207 would commence in 2006 with other European plants fulfilling the 
outstanding requirements for the 206. The dominant motive of cost reduction driving 
relocation is revealed in company figures estimating manufacturing costs at €578 per 
vehicle lower in Trnava than Ryton (Peugeot-Citroen, 2006b). Comparative pay rates, 
extrapolated for 2010, were calculated at €9.52 per hour for Trnava and €32.44 for 
Ryton. Given that significant strategic relocation requires years of planning, Peugeot 
undoubtedly had disregarded the need to consult employees at an early stage.   
 
Employees reacted with precisely the sense of shock that the Directive had been 
intended to obviate.   
 
I found out on the radio on the way to work. Neither the union nor management 
told us anything. We‟re gutted. We‟d heard rumours but no one had come out 
and told us what was happening, which makes me really angry. (Alan Brown, 
Coventry Evening Telegraph, 19/04/06)  
 
Such responses reflected the company‟s breach of promises to consult and the 
abrogation of its responsibilities under the Regulations. The company told national 
officers of „the decision taken not to source any new product into Ryton…at the same 
time as they informed the workforce‟ (National Officer, 22/09/06). In further 
contravention of the Regulations, presenting this restructuring initiative as a fait 
accompli prevented alternative courses of action from being pursued. Although the 
unions developed a case (Amicus-TGWU, 2006) based on Ryton‟s profitability, 
comparative costs, social responsibility and flexibility, they were on the defensive, 
reacting to the „done deal‟ and striving unsuccessfully to persuade Peugeot to negotiate. 
The union also campaigned against Peugeot‟s disregard of ICE, lobbying Alan Johnson 
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(Secretary of State for Trade and Industry) who had been responsible for enacting the 
Regulations.  
 
Johnson‟s response is significant in exposing weaknesses in regulatory enforcement 
and government unwillingness to challenge corporate decision-making. Although 
Johnson attacked Peugeot for backtracking on its promises, and claimed to have 
„pressed M. Folz to ensure that the company abided by its obligations under 
information and consultation legislation…to maintain a meaningful and constructive 
dialogue with the Unions on their alternative plans‟ (Letter to unions, 26/04/06), his 
department‟s position was to emphasise that closure was „a commercial matter for 
Peugeot‟ (DTI News Release, 18/04/06). Following discussions with local politicians, 
regional development agencies and unions regarding the „implications of your 
announcement‟ Johnson reassured Folz, 
 
I have made it clear to them, as I have in my public comments on the issue, the 
UK Government‟s appreciation that decisions such as this are ultimately a 
matter for the company. (Letter, 20/04/06) 
 
Thus, Peugeot‟s decision and the manner of its making were justifiable because of 
inviolable market forces. Meaningful employee consultation, even when backed by 
statutory force, was subordinated to corporate interests.  
 
Paralleling developments at Peugeot, GM-Europe declared 1,000 redundancies at 
Ellesmere Port, cutting the third shift and reducing headcount to 2,000 (Financial 
Times, 12/05/06). The workforce immediately responded with walkouts and „wildcat‟ 
strikes as GM rejected last-ditch proposals by European unions to „spread the pain‟ 
across plants in Belgium, German, Poland and Ellesmere Port. Despite the long-term 
threat to Ellesmere Port, GM‟s rejection of the unions‟ strategy nevertheless surprised 
the T&G and Amicus. A senior steward with over twenty-five years experience 
provided insight into the harsh consequences for UK employees of GM‟s „global‟ 
corporate strategy.   
 
…there will never be a security of work agreement - how can there be? The 
unions will always find it hard to reach an agreement that actually protects, 
while the company is building more capacity into the eastern European plants - 
there is no agreement here…They have just announced 700,000 capacity for 
two plants in Poland and Russia. Are the two plants for the eastern market only, 
or for Europe as a whole?  This is the contradiction in it all – take a shift out of 
Ellesmere Port because of overcapacity and at the same time build more 
capacity into the market. Scary stuff! (Interview, 04/04/06).  
 
On 20 May, the Plant Manager wrote to all workers explaining that the decision was 
due to „capacity adjustment‟ as the „most cost-efficient approach‟, and that while there 
could be no guarantees of future production, failure to accept the redundancy 
programme would certainly lead to closure. Thus, in the period following the 
company‟s announcement, just as in the months when GM had formulated its plans, no 
meaningful discussion took place with the unions.  
 
The company would say there was consultation, but we would say there wasn‟t.  
The consultation came after they made the decision. „We will have you in and 
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this is what is going to happen‟. It was a consultation of how are we going to 
introduce it, how are we to get rid of people. (Amicus officer, 16/11/06)  
 
These were the circumstances that ICE was intended to prevent. Yet, in both cases, the 
objectives of ensuring that employees have access to company information and 
participate in consultation over proposed business changes proved elusive.   
  
Finance Sector – Prudential and Aviva  
 
A thoroughgoing transformation in the structure and dynamics of the financial services 
sector has also taken place in recent years. The Financial Services and Building Society 
Acts (1986) collapsed the distinctions between the banking, insurance and mortgage 
markets and precipitated trends to merger and acquisition (Morris et al, 2001). 
Prudential‟s takeovers included Scottish Amicable (1997) and M&G (1999). Aviva was 
the re-branded name given to CGNU, the fusion of the Commercial General Union and 
Norwich Union (2000) both products of previous mergers. Driven by sector-wide 
intensified competition and pressures to maximise shareholder value the Prudential and 
Aviva embarked on near-continuous programmes of restructuring, re-engineering and 
relocation aimed at slashing overheads and cutting costs. Central to these were 
technologically-facilitated changes in the processes and loci of interactive servicing, 
notably the call centre‟s emergence as the dominant mode of customer contact (Bain 
and Taylor, 2002), and the digitilisation of the back-office (Miozzo and Soete, 2001).  
 
Both companies have been significant offshorers (Taylor and Bain, 2005). Without 
consultation, the Prudential decided to migrate 1,000 posts to Mumbai in September 
2002 and to close its Reading call centre but, following a vigorous Amicus campaign, 
conceded to a three-year „no compulsory redundancies‟ agreement (Amicus-Prudential, 
2002). From late-2003 Aviva moved call centre and back-office posts to three Indian 
third-party suppliers, but from 2006 has transferred them to a wholly-owned subsidiary, 
Aviva Global Services. By 2008, 7,800 jobs will be located in India (Norwich Union, 
2006a). Thus, in terms of company strategy, restructuring within the UK has become 
inextricably connected to the expansion of offshoring. By mid-2006 Prudential, as the 
second largest UK life insurance and pensions provider, had more than 7 million 
customers and employed around 6,000
4. Aviva, the UK‟s largest and the world‟s fifth 
largest insurance company, employed 36,000 in its UK operations.  
 
Prudential‟s industrial relations are dichotomous. While recognising Amicus for 
collective bargaining at its Reading, Belfast, Bristol and London sites, where overall 
union density was 56% (Interview seconded rep, 09/10/06), Prudential has resisted 
union attempts to extend recognition to Craigforth and Derby. Motivated by a desire to 
exclude Amicus, according to reps, the company continued at Craigforth to operate the 
paternalistic consultative body, the Employee Forum (EF), inherited from Scottish 
Amicable. The EF offered a soft consultative alternative potentially extendable across 
the company at the expense of Amicus and its reps network. Crucially, a divided 
workforce would weaken company-wide resistance to further restructuring. At Aviva, 
Amicus has a „Procedure and Facilities Agreement’ giving representation rights, but is 
not accorded recognition for collective bargaining. This limited entitlement largely 
results from historical union weakness in Aviva‟s constituent companies. Further, the 
                                                 
4
 It had 3m additional customers at its internet-based operation Egg which employed 3,000.  
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employers used merger to dilute the harder form of collectivism as represented by 
MSF-Amicus. The Norwich Union merger enabled management to recast industrial 
relations „from formal recognition to a partnership agreement which did not have 
recognition‟ (Interview seconded rep, 30/10/06).  
 
Against this background of these attempts to reduce union influence, both Prudential 
and Aviva introduced ICE arrangements anticipating the ICE Regulations‟ enactment. 
Prudential established an „Employee Forum‟ with a written constitution through a PEA 
which conformed to the Regulations (Prudential, 2004). Although riddled with 
imprecision regarding the Forum‟s remit and its relationship to collective bargaining, 
the „Forum‟s Purpose‟ appeared unambiguous; providing elected representatives with 
„regular [bi-annual] updates on issues affecting the business and employees (para.4.2), 
guaranteeing annual reviews [para.4.3] and commitments to „consultation‟ and 
dialogue. Pessimistically, though, union reps perceived management‟s motivations as 
twofold: formal compliance with Regulations and weakening collective organisation as 
Prudential pursued further restructuring and offshoring, following the ending of the job 
security agreement.  
 
Aviva established „Your Forum‟ (YF) in November 2004 without workforce approval, 
claiming that with union density at 30%, YF would provide representation for 70% of 
employees. Unsurprisingly, then, Amicus saw Aviva‟s legislative compliance as a 
further attempt to „sideline the union‟. YF‟s configuration reflected Aviva‟s 
organisational structure as separate forums were created for different businesses (e.g. 
Life Forum). From the beginning union reps elected to the YF reported Aviva‟s 
unwillingness to engage in meaningful consultation (Interview national officer, 
30/10/06).  
 
Union suspicions regarding respective company motives regarding ICE initiatives were 
confirmed. On 26 April 2006, Prudential announced £40m cost savings, to be delivered 
by a „locational strategy‟ involving 700 redundancies, including the closure of Belfast 
and Bristol and job losses at London and Reading. The majority of the work would be 
transferred to Mumbai but Craigforth would receive 200 jobs (Financial Times, 
27/04/06). Compulsory redundancies were unavoidable. Amicus perceived this 
restructuring as anti-union as it involved transferring work from union-dense (Belfast 
70%) to non-union locations (Mumbai, Craigforth, Derby).  During the period when 
Prudential was formulating plans no attempts were made to inform the workforce, the 
union or the EF, let alone engage in the promised „dialogue and exchange of views and 
a debate undertaken in good faith‟. Amicus was verbally informed on 24 April, with 
written notification given on 26 April, 15 minutes before hastily-arranged staff 
briefings, by which time news of the redundancies had already been made public.  
 
Reps recalled how they had been presented with a fait accompli, although the company 
maintained that consultation was only beginning.   
 
Certainly, what they said to us on the Monday was „This is a proposal, so the 
90-day consultation period starts now‟. However, once you have announced to 
the staff and the wider world that something is going to happen then it is not 
really a proposal. And particularly once you have gone to the City, which they 
did on the Wednesday morning and explained the cost savings, it wasn‟t really 
consultation. To me, consultation should take place at the idea stage, so once 
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they had an idea that they were thinking of closing Belfast down and needed to 
make cost savings, that‟s when they should have been talking to us (Senior 
seconded rep, 09/10/06).  
 
Prudential‟s unilateral decision-making foreclosed the exploration of alternatives 
involving Amicus or EF representatives. Nevertheless, the union produced detailed 
counter-proposals (Amicus, 2006) based on similar cost savings, but without recourse 
to compulsory redundancies and Belfast‟s closure. Significantly, Prudential did not 
differentiate between the EF and Amicus in that neither established collective 
bargaining mechanisms nor the new arrangements were used to communicate with or 
involve employees. „There was no added level of consultation through the Forum as 
had been promised‟ (ibid, 09/10/06). Ultimately, the EF‟s dependence on senior 
management rendered it incapable of acting on behalf of employees. This contrasted 
with Amicus‟ involvement in complex negotiations which led to Belfast‟s purchase by 
Capita, by which 450 jobs were transferred under the terms of the transfer of 
undertakings legislation (TUPE) (Capita, 2006).  
 
Similarly, on 14 September Aviva announced 4,000 job losses (with 600 offshored) of 
which 50% would be compulsory redundancies. The rationale was the need to create a 
„leaner organisation‟ delivering, for example, £125m cost savings for the Life business 
(Norwich Union, 2006b). Amicus was informed of the decision „fifteen minutes before 
[it] was announced to the stock market‟. Where YF was concerned Aviva strove, almost 
literally, to contain its ability to discuss, or reveal, details of the redundancies. 
Management had organised a Forum meeting on the day of the announcement which 
commenced at 8am.   
 
…a lot of the forum reps walked into that meeting and were flabbergasted 
because they didn‟t anticipate what was happening. They then more or less 
locked us into the room till 10 o‟clock…because the Stock Exchange were 
being told then…They are using the excuse of the Stock Exchange, that they 
legally can‟t speak to us before they have spoken to them, but that‟s not true 
(seconded rep, 30/10/06).  
 
As with the Prudential, Aviva claimed it was commencing „a programme of formal 
consultation‟ (Norwich Union, 2006a). However, as a rep insisted, „until you consult it 
should be a proposal‟ and the announcement was tantamount to an irrevocable decision.   
 
Prudential and Aviva are typical of much of the financial services sector where 
unprecedented restructuring has resulted in wholesale redundancies. Rather than 
offering some protection for employees, even at the modest level of information 
provision, consultation initiatives appeared to be motivated by minimal regulatory 
compliance and the desire to constrain unions‟ ability to contest restructuring strategies. 
In both instances the I&C bodies spectacularly failed their first major tests. Reflecting 
on the broader significance of the Regulations, Aviva‟s national officer commented, 
 
I guess ICE allows them to set up the forums. Having the forums allows them to 
sideline the union. And, having sidelined the union, when an announcement like 
the 4,000 job cuts is made, they don‟t have to engage with the union but, in 
reality, neither did they have to engage with the forums that they had set up. 
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Electronics/Telecommunications Sectors - Marconi  
 
During the 1990s the electronics company Marconi (formerly part of GEC)  re-branded 
itself as a high-tech telecommunications specialist. Selling off stable revenue-
generating sectors such as defence, it purchased extensively overseas (BBC News 
Online, 09/04/01). This strategic change proved disastrous, coinciding with over-
capacity in telecoms markets, a worldwide slowdown and the burst of the dot.com 
bubble. As Marconi‟s major customers drastically reduced equipment budgets the 
company‟s failure to diversify hit hard. Its value fell to £50m from £34bn before the 
dotcom crash. Between 2000 and 2005 Marconi shed 20,000 jobs globally and shrank 
its UK workforce to 4,300. A further massive setback was the failure in 2005 of British 
telecoms giant BT to include Marconi in the shortlist of suppliers chosen to develop 
„21st Century Network‟ (21CN) equipment, despite BT being Marconi‟s biggest and 
most significant customer. The share price plummeted at the news and major 
redundancies loomed. On 3 May 2005 the company agreed to consult the unions before 
any decisions were made but, on 6 May, it suddenly announced 800 redundancies and 
the closure of its Liverpool plant (The Guardian, 07/05/05). In October, Ericsson 
bought Marconi‟s operational side, retaining 3,000 workers in the UK. The small 
remainder of Marconi, re-named Telent, was reconfigured as a services provider for 
telecoms companies.  
 
Across Marconi union membership had remained at around 30%, with Amicus the 
major union and additional membership in the T&G and GMB and the company had a 
long-established practice of site-based bargaining. Prior to 2005 there were no I & C 
arrangements, not even a European Works Council (EWC), despite Marconi plants in 
Italy and Germany
5
. Then, abruptly, in January 2005 Marconi announced that it was 
establishing a forum through the PEA route. Suspicions that union exclusion was the 
motivation were confirmed by the fact that only two weeks were allowed for 
representatives‟ nominations and elections. Unions were not consulted about the 
arrangements, nor given a written copy of the constitution. Since the Forum‟s fifteen 
constituencies were based on business units, the effect was to minimize unions‟ site-
based representation, locking the union into a minority of constituencies. It was only 
after the elections that Marconi presented a constitution to the forum using the post hoc 
signatories of its reps to claim workforce approval. The Amicus national officer insisted 
that the intention was to by-pass the unions.  
 
They started to put company policies through this forum; not pay and conditions 
but they clearly were going to use it, not to get agreement, but to wave proposed 
policies in front of them.  The only thing that stopped that happening was after 
April, and the whole future of Marconi…then everything was blown out of the 
water. (Interview, 29/11/06) 
 
Significantly, the Forum was not warned of the forthcoming redundancies. Unlike 
Amicus which used its external profile and access to government departments and 
ministers,  
 
                                                 
5
 As Amicus already represented Ericsson workers, the subsequent sale presented few organising 
problems. Ericsson had an I&C body, although much weaker than its Swedish equivalent, and an EWC. 
Industrial Relations/Relations Industrielles 64 (1) 09:  Accepted revised version 
 15 
…the information and consultation body itself was hardly involved at all in the 
serious issues. Very, very, superficial involvement. Ironically, we [the union] 
probably got more information from the company than the consultation body. 
(ibid) 
 
A final issue concerns the non-disclosure of information, where the company cited 
confidentiality and the Stock Exchange rules as reasons
6. That Marconi‟s actions were 
taken for tactical rather than regulatory reasons is evidenced by the fact that anonymous 
briefings about likely bidders were given to the financial press.  
 
They were using the press to say things they weren‟t telling the unions, the I & 
C body, or the workforce.  So, when it was in their interests, they were quite 
happy to publicise stuff and give information out, not to the unions but the press 
to maximize their sale price. (ibid) 
 
In sum, the introduction of a PEA with no prior consultation indicates minimal 
regulatory compliance and union marginalisation. In the event, its establishment 
coincided with Marconi‟s crisis and it is noteworthy that the forum was not considered 
suitable for communicating with employees nor for discussing the implications for jobs 
of Ericsson‟s takeover. Evidently the Regulations made little impact on company 
actions in the wake of the company‟s crisis. Initial promises to consult were short-
circuited as Marconi decided unilaterally to close plants and enforce redundancies.  
 
Aerospace/Engineering Industry - Rolls Royce  
 
Rolls-Royce is one of the two leading global suppliers of gas turbines and power 
systems for aircraft, marine and energy use. In 2005, the company employed 34,488 
workers worldwide, nearly 21,000 in the UK. At its Bristol plant, this case study‟s 
locus, restructuring halved employee numbers to 4,000 between 1995 and 2005. Bristol 
has been subject to two salient drivers of change, emanating from a shifting economic 
environment characterised by intense global competition and the ability of customers to 
exert significant price reductions (Danford et al, 2005). Firstly, the plant was 
reorganised from a unitary division responsible for manufacturing military aero-engines 
into a more complex matrix structure of „customer-focused business units‟ (profit 
centres), deigned to reduce (particularly labour) costs. It created managerial pressure to 
fragment site-wide collective bargaining by devolution to these units (Danford et al, 
2002). Secondly, management‟s „make-buy‟ strategy has involved downsizing and 
cutting labour costs by subcontracting key design and manufacturing work packages. 
 
Collective bargaining arrangements were conventional as the manual and non-manual 
unions divided into bargaining groups. Amicus dominated both and union density was 
100% and 70% respectively (Interview convenor, 22/10/06). Discussions on policy 
issues, such as company strategy and staffing levels, were covered by multi-tiered 
consultative forums comprising bi-weekly meetings with HR managers, monthly 
meetings with the corporate director of operations, quarterly meetings of management 
and union representatives in the largest business unit, Defence Europe, and twice-yearly 
                                                 
6
 The UK‟s Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) makes it clear that Stock Exchange 
„Listing Rules‟ rarely justify a blanket restriction on information and consultation on commercial 
matters. They differentiate between employees and employee reps so that price sensitive information can 
be given to reps in confidence before the market is notified.   
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meetings of a Global Council
7
. Meetings with HR managers and the director of 
operations were new informal forums arising from the implementation of a Modern 
Working Practices Agreement (MWPA). Full-time officers were excluded from all 
consultative committees except the Global Council, conditions regarded as restricting 
union influence (Full time officer, 22/10/06). 
 
Immediately following the Regulations‟ enactment, Rolls-Royce established a UK 
Information and Consultation Council. Its remit was to provide early consultation on 
business issues affecting employees and to provide information and consultation, 
enabling opinions to be considered before decisions were reached (Rolls-Royce, 2006). 
Its terms of reference were agreed by a national negotiating committee of managers and 
senior union representatives prior to „technical‟ consultation with the workforce, but no 
ballot was held to endorse it. The Council included 29 employee representatives from 
the eight largest plants (all union nominees and virtually all shop stewards), plus three 
covering smaller sites.  
 
Since the Council‟s institution there have been no redundancies in Rolls-Royce‟s UK 
plants to test the robustness of its founding principles of joint consultation and advance 
warning. Nevertheless, management has used the Council to engender a strategic shift 
attempting to change the locales of collective bargaining and replace bargaining with 
weaker consultation. Pursuing business-unit level bargaining on the micro-processes of 
policy implementation, such as MWPA, was accompanied by shifting discussions on 
terms and conditions (traditionally covered by site-wide collective bargaining) to the 
National Council. Management‟s ability to achieve this shift was partly aided by the 
unions having understandably placed less experienced stewards on the Council, seeing 
it initially as another burdensome layer of consultation. Consequently, management 
found it easier to ignore the consultation process completely when it suited them, or to 
raise issues governing changes to terms and conditions on the Council agenda, and once 
„consultation‟ had taken place to implement changes8.   
  
Redundancy agreements and standardised conditions provide examples of 
management‟s attempt to use the National Council to replace plant-based negotiations 
with weak national consultation. The catalyst was the company‟s response to the 
Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006. It claimed that the existing redundancy 
agreement contravened the regulations by offering unequal terms dependent on age. 
Management sought to alter the agreement, in effect a change to terms and conditions,  
by raising the issue at National Council, rather than attempting formal negotiation with 
site unions. Similarly, management was seeking to effect inter-site standardisation of 
non-pay related terms and conditions (sick pay and compassionate leave) by discussion 
at Council rather than through union negotiations. One convenor commented: 
 
So they used the ageism document to change the redundancy document and they 
unilaterally just changed it without any reference back to us at all. It was all one 
way and HR blamed the UK Council. They said they consulted with them, but it 
was all one-way consultation, there was nothing coming back the other way.  
They just said they were going to use the ageism document even further to 
                                                 
7
 The Rolls-Royce plc Global Council, established in 2005, replaced the hybrid EWC. According to the 
Convenor, consultation at GC did not offer meaningful union influence over company decision-making. 
8
 Interviews reveal several instances involving such as the use of agency labour, changes to a redundancy 
agreement, the standardisation of UK conditions, the payment of holiday pay to retirees and job transfers. 
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standardise sick pay schemes, leave of absence, to just standardise 
everything…So our collective bargaining rights are going to disappear under 
that document (Manual convenor, 22/10/06). 
 
However, union protestations forced the company to retreat and place the issue on the 
plant bargaining agenda. Given that the period since the forum‟s introduction has not 
seen the company propose redundancies, Rolls-Royce‟s consultative arrangements have 
not been subject to the most meaningful test of their effectiveness. Nevertheless, a clear 
pattern has emerged of attempts to exploit ICE in order to substitute national 
consultation for plant bargaining. Management suggest that the prospects are not 
favourable that Rolls-Royce will engage in meaningful consultation when forthcoming 
restructuring initiatives occasion further redundancies.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The evidence presented exposes major faultlines in the effectiveness of UK‟s ICE 
Regulations to provide employees with even the most limited protection against 
corporate plans to reorganise production and make wholesale redundancies. In five 
cases companies failed to inform or consult with their employees regarding their future 
employment. Explicitly in three cases (Prudential, Aviva, Marconi), and potentially in 
another (Rolls Royce), consultative arrangements provided opportunities to by-pass or 
undermine the union. In the finance sector arrangements were introduced in part 
because of the coincidental need to weaken collective resistance to restructuring. In 
motor manufacturing unions were simply ignored in circumstances where no 
consultative mechanisms had been established. In practice, companies treated unions 
and consultative forums with similar disdain. Contrary to management claims, ICE-
inspired mechanisms have not provided added levels of representation either to 
complement unions, or to fill the „representation gap‟ left by declining membership.  
 
In all five cases involving job loss the workforces were presented with a fait accompli, 
in contravention of the supposed requirement that consultation should occur at the 
anticipatory stage. The Amicus officer for the electronics industry commented on this 
deficit.  
 
Consultation, whether it‟s to do with redundancy or health and safety or broad 
information and consultation, is not meaningful unless the trade union and those 
representing the workforce have the opportunity and the ability to make the 
company re-consider its proposals.  So my view is that, whether it‟s a trade 
union in its own right or an I&C body, we should be involved at the „glint in the 
eye stage‟, before decisions are made - before they‟ve gone through the board or 
senior executive committee...(Interview, 29/11/06). 
 
This failure to consult raises wider questions about the wider political and legislative 
environment in the UK, where the law apparently allows companies peremptorily to 
make workers redundant. Amicus General Secretary Derek Simpson complained to 
Alan Johnson over Ryton‟s closure, that ministers were „limited in the support that they 
could give because they have created the regime which has allowed the company to 
behave like this‟ (The Times, 21/04/06); British workers were being sacrificed in the 
interests of maintaining „a flexible labour market‟ (The Guardian, 19/04/06).  
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Essentially, the Directive‟s transposition involved the „de-Europeanization‟ of the idea 
of worker consultation. In continental Europe, the development of consultative 
structures (e.g. works councils) has represented the idea that labour rights, such as 
joining a union or being consulted and informed, are basic human rights and an 
extension of the principles of democracy. The UK‟s failure is ultimately a political 
failure as the government opposed the ICE Directive in principle and, under the impact 
of employers‟ influence, produced Regulations that significantly diluted what, even in 
the original, were hardly radical proposals.  
 
Growing union concerns regarding ICE should be rooted in a critical understanding of 
developments in UK employment legislation since 1997, which locate the ICE 
Regulations in Labour‟s subordination of its social-democratic heritage to neo-
liberalism (Smith and Morton, 2006). Not only are there limitations in the statutory 
union-recognition procedures of the Employment Relations Act but Labour, despite its 
swift reversal of the Conservative‟s derogation of the „social chapter‟ of the Treaty of 
Maastricht (1992), has consistently remained sceptical of the European model of a 
regulated labour market. As Fairness at Work stated, „Some aspects of the social 
models developed in Europe before the advent of global markets have arguably become 
incompatible with competitiveness‟ (DTI, 1998: 10). Labour has continued policies of 
delaying and diluting EC Directives and then implementing them in a minimalist 
manner.  
 
Clearly no amount of consultation or information will halt the process of capitalist 
reconstruction and relocation. However, the evidence from continental Europe shows 
that „Social Dialogue‟ in such circumstances can ameliorate the shock and allow a more 
ordered and negotiated transition in which unions and workplace reps can at least 
attempt to secure the best deal for their members. Given that ICE can be effective only 
insofar as the broader labour law regime allows, the „liberal‟ character of UK 
legislation places unions at a strategic disadvantage.  Specifically, the absence of 
mechanisms of enforcement and of social and institutional deterrents leaves unions and 
the workers they represent vulnerable to companies‟ unilateral decisions. The Amicus 
officer for the motor vehicle industry observed of ICE that, „It‟s a dog with no teeth, it 
barks a lot but it ain‟t going to bite you if you are not frightened of it‟. All the trade 
unionists interviewed were emphatic that a reversal of policy and the restoration of 
collectivism are required to give workers some safeguards against the perpetual 
processes of corporate restructuring that increasingly jeopardise their livelihood. To 
date, the Regulations have failed to put an end to the sorry tales of workers hearing on 
car radios on their way to work that they have lost their jobs.    
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